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# SALT Linked to Assurance on Cuba Uni

Associated Press

President Carter will be able to give assurances before a final Senate vote on SALT II that Soviet military forces in Cuba are "not engaged in a combat role," a White House official testified yesterday.

After that statement by White House counsel Lloyd Cutler, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 13 to 2 to condition final approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty on the president's affirmation that Soviet forces are not engaged in a combat role and "will not become a threat to any country" in the Western Hemisphere.

The understanding was offered by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who noted that while the United States has identified the Soviet brigade as a com-

bat unit, the Soviets insist its only mission is to train Cubans.

"This understanding would simply require the Russians to comply to the assurances they have given us," Church said.

But Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and other SALT critics said the understanding is essentially meaningless and potentially troublesome.

"This places an impossible predicament on the president," Lugar said. "At some point he is going to have to place his hand on the Bible and give assurances that the Soviet military forces in Cuba are not engaged in a combat role and do not pose a threat to any country in the area. The presi-

dent is going to be accused of affirming something he simply could not affirm."

Cutler said the administration has no objection to the understanding, and believes "that in the light of the assurances obtained from the Soviet Union and in the light of our own continuing intensified surveillance and in the light of the countermeasures the United States has taken to guard against a threat to any other country that the president will be able to give these assurances."

Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) called the understanding "insufficient, but a step in the right direction."

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ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES  
26 OCTOBER 1979

# Soviet Arms Pact Gets the Support Of Senator Byrd

## Further Changes by Critics Defeated in Committee

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 — The Senate majority leader, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, endorsed the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union today and said he had obtained a promise from President Carter that the United States would proceed with the MX mobile intercontinental missile.

At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee defeated what had been viewed as politically attractive but potentially fatal amendments to the treaty.

Senator Byrd and others conceded that its ultimate fate was still in doubt, but today's developments seemed to give impetus to efforts aimed at approval.

### Javits Sees Pact 'in Strong Shape'

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, called the committee votes "highly desirable" steps and said "so far the treaty is emerging in strong shape."

But a Senate staff member associated with the opposition said supporters were considerably short of putting together the two-thirds majority needed for approval.

The Foreign Relations Committee met in closed session to vote on proposals that would have made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to cheat on the treaty terms. Officials of the Carter Administration warned that Moscow would probably not agree to these changes.

### Missile Test Data at Issue

One of the proposals was an understanding requiring Soviet assent that would have barred any interference with the transmission of radio signals containing missile flight-test data. Experts say that such data, needed for treaty verification, could be denied by a number of methods, such as dropping tape recordings from missiles or reducing the power of the signals.

The understanding, offered by Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, was voted down by 9 to 6. The committee also defeated an amendment that would have allowed each party to collect data on the territory of the other party, and an understanding that would have required prior notification of all missile launchings.

At a news conference this afternoon, Senator Byrd not only announced support

written assurance that he intended to proceed with the controversial MX and with ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles when a treaty protocol that temporarily forbids their deployment expires Dec. 31, 1981. This assurance may swing some wavering Senate votes in favor of the treaty, but it may also alienate liberal Senators who oppose the MX.

Senator Byrd apparently felt that clarity on the MX was politically desirable. Many figures have expressed the opinion that it will never be built and will be bargained away in negotiations on a future arms treaty to replace the present pact when it expires.

The Foreign Relations Committee will require at least one more week to finish debating and voting on documents associated with the treaty. It will be mid-November before the text can be sent to the Senate. But, with its actions today, the majority in favor of the treaty has beaten back virtually all of the so-called killer amendments in committee.

These victories had been expected, perhaps by even larger margins, and will have to be refought on the floor of the Senate where the outcome is unpredictable.

Still to be voted on next week in the committee is a proposal by Senator Glenn that would more firmly assure that the Soviet Union will not increase the intercontinental capability of the TU-22M bomber, known as Backfire in the West. The proposal is expected to be defeated.

Senator Byrd, in his news conference in an ornate anteroom of the Senate wing of the Capitol, expressed the opinion that the Senate could finish other legislative business and take up the treaty just before or just after Thanksgiving.

In the past he said he would probably not call up the treaty if it seemed likely to be defeated. Today he said so many senators were keeping their intentions secret until the final roll-call that it might be impossible to get a count before the vote. For that reason, he said, he is now inclined to "go win or lose."

Senator Byrd read parts of a 5,000-word statement analyzing the main treaty provisions and the opposition arguments against them.

"What we do here and now will not be judged by polls or elections but in the cold, clear light of history," the statement concluded.

Senator Byrd said the treaty was in the national interest and should be approved with understandings and reservations already adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee that would not require renegotiation or risk rejection by the Soviet Union.

In dealing with most objections to the

treaty, Senator Byrd said that the consequences of rejection would increase possible hazards to United States security by erasing any limitations on the Soviet Union's freedom of action.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the chairman, publicly announced the results of the votes taken today by the Foreign Relations Committee in closed session. He said the treaty amendment, by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, permitting intelligence collection on the soil of each country had been defeated by a vote of 9 to 6. Senator Glenn's understanding requiring prior notification of missile launchings was beaten by the same margin.

The committee approved by unanimous votes much more innocuous versions of these proposals, exhorting the United States to regard interference with flight-test signals as a cause for complaint and to seek a launching-notification clause in a future treaty. Senator Lugar called these understandings, which need not even be communicated to the Soviet Union, toothless.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
25 OCTOBER 1979

## 2 MORE AMENDMENTS OF ARMS PACT LOSE

Modifications Proposed by Baker  
Were Aimed at the Elimination  
of Soviet Heavy Missiles

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today rejected two amendments to the strategic arms limitation treaty that would have required the Soviet Union to dismantle its most powerful missiles.

The changes, proposed by the Republican leader, Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, were defeated 9 to 6. One of the amendments would have required the dismantling of the 308 Soviet heavy-missile launchers. A second would have canceled the treaty if no agreement on dismantling was reached by 1982.

The committee chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, and spokesmen for the Administration said the proposals would cause Moscow to refuse to ratify the treaty. Senator Church said that if such changes were not defeated the committee "might just as well shut up shop."

Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who yesterday supported a Baker amendment giving the United States the right to match Soviet deployment of heavy missiles, voted against today's changes.

### Byrd Expected to Announce Stand

The majority leader, Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, is expected to announce his support of the treaty, perhaps at a news conference scheduled for tomorrow. The Republican whip, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, said today that, while he might vote for a modified treaty, he would vote against the present text.

Later today the Foreign Affairs Committee went into closed session to hear officials explain their objections to proposed modifications designed to facilitate treaty verification.

Proposals introduced by Senator Glenn and by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, would prohibit practices that impede the collection of signals from missiles during flight tests.

Senator Glenn's proposal is in the form of an "understanding" and would require Soviet assent. He said in a telephone interview that the Administration was asking him to make changes in the wording and to cast the proposal in different form to avoid the need for Soviet assent.

Senators Glenn and Lugar also proposed changes requiring prior notice of test flights within Soviet territory.

Election politics intruded into the discussion today. Lloyd N. Cutler, White House counsel, said the elimination of the Soviet heavy missiles had long been a goal of United States Presidents and remained a legitimate objective for the next arms treaty.

"It may be, Senator Baker, that you will have the high privilege of conducting that negotiation," Mr. Cutler said, alluding to the Senator's Presidential aspirations, "but it would be beyond even your capability to negotiate that as part of SALT II."

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
24 October 1979

# Baker Amendment to SALT Pact Rebuffed

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

An attempt by Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) to alter the strategic arms limitation treaty substantially failed by a single vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

Three Democrats joined Baker and three other Republicans to vote for the proposal, which Baker said yesterday had only symbolic significance, and which he had described last June as "a movement in the wrong direction."

Treaty supporters said the Baker amendment would effectively kill SALT II. A combination of six Democrats and two Republicans voted to defeat it.

Also yesterday, Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) threatened to bring SALT II up on the floor before the Senate considers the "wind-fall profits" tax on oil companies, a move that would disrupt the Senate's schedule but perhaps improve the chances of a vote on SALT II this year.

Baker's proposal was to permit the United States to build and deploy 308 "heavy" land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to match the Soviets in this category. Baker admitted, however, that the United States does not want this type of weapon and would not build it even if permitted to do so by the treaty.

Last June, when Baker first announced that he was opposing SALT II as written because of his concern over heavy missiles, among other issues, he was asked if he would favor the sort of amendment he proposed yesterday. Baker replied that he would not, that such an amendment would be a "movement in the wrong direction" because it would further the arms race, not reduce superpower arsenals.

Yesterday Baker said he still preferred eliminating the Soviet Union's heavy missiles, but would favor the approach of his proposal as better than nothing.

The Soviets' 308 heavy missiles are much bigger than anything the United States has ever built or even contemplated. The first SALT agreement on offensive arms and then SALT II permit the Soviets to maintain these rockets, the heart of the Soviet Union's land-based force, while prohibiting the United States from acquiring them.

The Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations justified this exception for the Soviets' heavy missiles as simply a reflection of the status quo for which the United States is compensated in other provisions of the SALT agreements. But Baker said yesterday that the exception was a one-sided provision that contradicted the Senate's instructions, given when SALT I was approved, that SALT II should give the United States strategic nuclear forces that are "not inferior" to those of the Soviet Union.

Baker said he was sure that a firmer negotiating position would have persuaded the Soviets to give up some or all of the SS9 and SS18 rockets, which are the most formidable weapons in their arsenal.

Presidential counsel Lloyd N. Cutler, speaking for the administration, said that Baker's proposal, if adopted, would lead to reopening the SALT negotiations, and would require the United States to make new concessions to the Soviets. This, said Cutler, was too high a price to pay for a

change in the treaty that Baker acknowledged was only symbolic.

Last week, the chairman of Baker's undeclared presidential campaign, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), warned the Foreign Relations Committee against approving "cosmetic" changes in SALT II, then claiming that it had taken a tough position. Cutler picked up Lugar's language yesterday, saying of Baker's heavy missile proposal: "If there ever was a cosmetic amendment, this is it."

The three Democrats who voted for Baker's proposal were John Glenn (Ohio), Richard Stone (Fla.) and Edward Zorinsky (Neb.).

Byrd suggested the possibility of considering SALT before the "wind-fall profits" tax at a breakfast for congressional leaders at the White House yesterday. Byrd has been trying, without success so far, to get unanimous consent for a time agreement that would limit the SALT debate.

Senate leaders apparently hope that the threat of losing their long Christmas and New Year's recess will be enough to get action on SALT this year, but that schedule remains problematical.



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THE WASHINGTON POST  
23 October 1979

# Panel to Consider SALT Amendments Requiring Notice Before Soviet Tests

By Robert G. Kaiser  
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a week of essentially predictable votes on the provisions of SALT II, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday began discussion of proposed amendments that could significantly alter the treaty.

The new amendments, all of which relate to U.S. capability to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT II, probably will be voted on later this week. Committee sources speculated yesterday that pro-treaty forces will have problems blocking the amendments.

The amendment that has the most apparent appeal will be proposed, perhaps in differing forms, by Sens. John Glenn (D-Ohio) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.). Both Senators propose eliminating from the treaty, in effect, a provision that would allow the Soviet Union to conduct most of its tests of land-based missiles without notifying the United States in advance that the tests were about to take place.

The treaty provision that both senators want to amend is one of a handful that Carter administration officials acknowledge apply unequally to the Soviet Union and the United States. In effect, the provision requires the United States to give the Soviets advance notice of all its land-based missile tests, while allowing the Soviets not to give notice on most of their tests.

Before the loss of American listening stations in Iran—which could pick up the radio transmissions from Soviet test flights moments after blast-off—this distinction was not regarded as significant. But the various intelligence-gathering techniques now under consideration to make up for the loss of the Iranian posts could all be vastly more effective if the United States had prior notification of Soviet tests.

The provision in question requires prenotification of all single ICBM launches by either country "except for single ICBM launches . . . which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory."

American test launches all leave U.S. national territory, landing at sea, but the Soviets' most-used test range goes from Tyuratam in southern Russia to the Kamchatka peninsula near Alaska, all within Soviet territory.

Glenn and Lugar yesterday announced their intentions to address this matter with proposed amendments later in the week. Carter administration officials met among themselves and with the committee in closed session yesterday to discuss these and related proposals.

Earlier yesterday the committee voted unanimously to adopt a declaration that nothing in SALT II will prevent the United States from continuing to help NATO countries with conventional and nuclear military assistance. The vote on this reservation, offered by Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), was 14 to 0.

The committee made this, in effect, a declaration of Senate attitudes. Before the 14-0 vote, it rejected two attempts to make this statement a formal reservation to the resolution of ratification that the Soviets would have to explicitly accept or acknowledge.

Lugar and Glenn were allied on this issue also, arguing that the United States should make the Soviets acknowledge this U.S. position to avoid any misunderstandings in the future. Administration officials and several other senators responded that it was a bad precedent to suggest to the Soviets that they have any say in U.S.-NAIO relations, and further that the United States had made clear its in-

tentions during negotiations with the Soviets.

During the negotiations, the Soviets had pressed for a "non-transfer" clause that might have precluded U.S. transfer of potentially strategic weaponry to the NATO allies, but the United States would not accept this. Instead, the treaty contains a "non-circumvention" provision declaring that neither side will circumvent its provisions "through any other state or states, or in any other manner." The United States contends that this only declares an obvious fact of international law and has no consequences for U.S.-NATO relations.

An attempt by Lugar to force the Soviets to accept formally the U.S. interpretation of the non-circumvention clause failed in the committee, 10 to 4. Glenn then suggested that at least the Senate give the Soviets formal notification of the U.S. position, but this was beaten, 8 to 6. The issue is likely to come up again on the Senate floor.

Glenn has a package of six proposed amendments related to monitoring the treaty, though he may not introduce them all. One would require both countries not to change the methods by which they send information on rocket test flights back to earth. Another would require them to agree with each other before encoding any of the radio messages ("telemetry") transmitted to earth by a test rocket.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
16 OCTOBER 1979

## Senate Panel Begins Voting on Arms-Pact Changes

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today began considering modifications of the nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union and adopted two measures that opponents of the treaty dismissed as "cosmetic."

The committee nearly wandered into a diplomatic minefield by discussing the possibility of rewording the assurances from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, on the bomber known in the West as the Backfire. But when Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, and the White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, pointed out the diplomatic dangers of such a demand, the committee agreed to postpone action on the Backfire bomber question.

In one vote today the committee voted 13 to 0 to make the "Agreed Statements and Common Understandings" that help define the terms and obligations of the treaty to be "of the same force and effect as the provisions of the treaty itself."

The Carter Administration said the reservation was unnecessary because the "statements and understandings," which were signed by President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna last June, were "clearly binding." However, the White House did not oppose the step on the ground that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would object.

### Calls Vote 'Cosmetic'

Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, a Republican who opposes the treaty, said that "this is a cosmetic change if there ever was one." Senator Lugar suggested that supporters of the treaty may hope to make it appear they are "making constructive changes" in order to "cover yourself for a pro-SALT vote."

The committee also adopted, by a vote of 10 to 2, an "understanding" proposed by Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, which called for the joint statement of principles on negotiations for the next arms limitation treaty, agreed to by both nations but not submitted for ratification, be mentioned in the Senate's resolution as providing the "basis" for future negotiations.

Earlier, the committee seemed to come close to posing a serious difficulty for the treaty. The issue was an unsigned statement and an oral statement on the Backfire bomber given by Mr. Brezhnev to President Carter in Vienna in June. Together the statements indicated that the Soviet Union would not increase the annual production rate of the Backfire bomber beyond 30 planes and did not intend to give it intercontinental capability or extend its radius of range.

The motion was to pass a Senate understanding stating that the Brezhnev statements were a legally binding part of the treaty.

### Seek to Clarify Brezhnev Statement

However, Senator John H. Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, pointed out that the Soviet Union had told the United States that it would not be bound by American interpretations of the Brezhnev statement. Several Senators then began to discuss changing the wording of the Brezhnev statement to "clarify" it.

Senator Sarbanes and the White House pointed out that the Soviet Union might object strongly to any Senate change in the wording of President Brezhnev's statement. Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the Committee chairman, then announced that the motion was being withdrawn for "redrafting" and consideration at a later time.

Senators Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky and Birch Bayh of Indiana, both Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, introduced a reservation to the treaty that would require the Presi-

dent to report to the Senate every six months on how the treaty was being verified, on Soviet practices that effect verification and on possible treaty violations.

The committee leadership is expected to be able to stave off passage of the so-called "killer amendments" that would be likely to cause Moscow to reject it.

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# Leader Byrd Nears SALT Endorsement; Senate Committee Starts Voting Monday

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) appeared on the brink of formally endorsing the strategic arms limitation treaty yesterday as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared to begin voting on it Monday.

Although Byrd insisted at a press conference that he hasn't quite made up his mind whether to endorse the arms treaty with the Soviet Union, which is President Carter's single most important request to Congress this year, Byrd revealed that he had met with "eight to 10 senators" privately Friday to seek some idea of how much defense spending must be beefed up to quell fears of national-security dangers.

Byrd said that if "the McGoverns and the Nunn, the Stennises and the Moynihans" could get together and draw some compromise "fine line" on what to spend and on certain other national security concepts, "then we could put together a two-thirds majority on the SALT treaty."

He said he had asked Majority Whip Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who has been sharply critical of the Soviets, to head special units to study both arms reduction and needed increases in defense spending. The Friday meeting, he said, included several

Republicans but he declined to name anyone present.

Byrd said he has told the White House flatly that the treaty won't come to the Senate floor for a final vote until and unless it hands over five-year military spending projections, with some details, which he said in many cases firms lobbying for defense contracts already know. He said the president had agreed to supply the projections.

As Byrd appeared to be nearing open endorsement of the treaty, Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) announced in Chicago that he will vote for the treaty provided the Senate adopts two "understandings," which he expects. One makes clear the United States can continue transferring defense technology to its allies; the other requires Senate approval before a three-year "protocol," limiting some missile ranges, can be extended further.

The Foreign Relations Committee on Friday killed by a 10 to 5 vote a proposal by Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) to delay any consideration of the treaty until it can study the implications of the five-year projections, once they are received from Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Instead, it agreed to start voting Monday. Glenn was joined by Republicans Howard H. Baker (Tenn.), Richard Lugar (Ind.), S.I. Hayakawa (Calif.) and Jesse Helms (N.C.).

Byrd, who said he favors televising the Senate SALT debate provided a

time limit can be agreed on, said his own reading of "backup materials" has convinced him that "funding more money" to beef up U.S. arms is a must with or without the treaty in view of Soviet strides. He said that on verification of the SALT agreements, the "bottom line" of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assessment is "that without SALT II our ability to monitor [Soviet arms] is going to be less than that with SALT II—the committee seemed to be pretty much unified on that point."

Byrd also told reporters:

- He doesn't particularly like GOP presidential candidate John Connally's concept of using U.S. forces to keep peace in the Mideast and he thinks Carter's Camp David approach is better.

- Gasoline lines "will be back, no question they'll be back," so it's good that Congress is moving to pass major energy and synfuels legislation.

- Attaching anti-abortion and other substantive legislative provisions to appropriations bills and thereby holding up the U.S. budget is becoming a "legislative abomination . . . a nightmare . . . legislative blackmail" and he hopes to get together with House leaders on some way to control it.

- With luck, Congress might be able to complete energy, synfuels, appropriations and windfall-profits legislation, and then complete SALT, by Thanksgiving, but "we may be in till Christmas" though he doesn't really believe it will be that long.

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World

October 11, 1979 - John Isaacs

## AMENDMENTS, RESERVATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS TO SALT II

The following is an updated list of amendments, reservations and understandings that have been discussed as part of the debate on the SALT II treaty. Some have been formally introduced; others have only been discussed.

The proposed language additions and changes are listed by topics, with the Senator or Senators who have proposed the amendment, reservation, or understanding listed after each topic.

### Backfire bomber: Church & Javits, Biden, Goldwater

Church & Javits have proposed the following reservation at the end of the Resolution of Ratification:

"That the commitments contained in the Soviet written statement which President Brezhnev handed to President Carter on June 16, 1979, concerning the Soviet TU-22M (Backfire) bomber, and the statement by President Brezhnev of June 17, 1979, that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year, are essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty, and that these commitments are legally binding on the Soviet Union and their violation would give the United States the right to withdraw from the Treaty."

Biden proposed July 10 a comprehensive understanding to deal with a variety of concerns expressed in Foreign Relations Committee hearings. On the subject of Backfire, Biden proposed the following language:

"With regard to production and deployment of the Soviet Backfire bomber, that the written and verbal assurances set forth by President Brezhnev shall be considered integral to the Treaty."

Goldwater introduced Amendment No. 412 June 5 to force counting the Backfire in SALT limits.

"Paragraph 3(a) of Article II is amended after "Tupolev-95" by inserting a comma and the following: "Tupolev-M, (Known to the United States of America as the Backfire)."

Another amendment, reservation or understanding might be offered asserting the right of the United States to build a bomber comparable to the Soviet Backfire bomber.

Agreed statements and understandings: Church & Javits, Biden

Church & Javits proposed on August 5 the following reservation at the end of the Resolution of Ratification:

"That the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings regarding the Treaty and the Protocol, transmitted by the President on June 22, 1979, with the Treaty, are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty itself."

Biden proposed July 10 a comprehensive understanding to deal with a variety of concerns expressed in Foreign Relations Committee hearings. On this subject, Biden suggested the following text:

"With regard to agreed statements and common understandings, the memorandum of understanding regarding data, and the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations, that such associated documents shall also be considered integral to the Treaty."

Non-circumvention language: Church & Javits, Percy, Biden, Roth

A number of proposals have been made to add language to make it clear that Article XIX, the non-circumvention clause, does not prevent the United States from selling weapons to or sharing information with our allies.

Church & Javits proposed August 5 the following understanding at the end of the Resolution of Ratification:

"That nothing in the Treaty or Protocol thereto affects existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation between the United States and its allies, or precludes cooperation between the United States and its allies in the modernization of nuclear and conventional weapons required for their common defense. The United States will reject any attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the basis of the non-circumvention provisions of this Treaty, questions concerning such collaboration and cooperation between the United States and its allies."

Percy proposed July 13 the following understanding (Amendment No. 414) to go at the end of the resolution of ratification:

"Subject to the understanding, which is to be made a part of the instrument of ratification, that nothing in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms prohibits the United States from continuing traditional patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its allies, and this would include the transfer of technology relating to cruise missiles."



Biden, in his comprehensive understanding of July 10, proposed the following language:

"With regard to the non-circumvention provisions of Article XII, that such provisions shall not impede traditional patterns of military and technological cooperation between the United States and its allies, and that such cooperation shall continue in all ways necessary to ensure the common defense of member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance."

Roth has discussed offering language on this topic without proposing specific text.

Protocol precedents and extension: Church & Javits, Biden, Percy, Lugar, Hart

A number of Senators have been concerned with the Protocol to the treaty and whether, despite its expiration date at the end of 1981, it might be extended without Senate approval.

Church & Javits proposed August 5 the following understanding to follow the resolution of ratification:

"That the Protocol to the Treaty, which expires by its terms on December 31, 1981, may only be extended in whole or in part, with the advice and consent of the Senate provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

Biden, as part of his comprehensive understanding of July 10, proposed the following language:

"With regard to the provisions of the Protocol, that such provisions shall not without Senate concurrence be legally extended beyond December 1981 and shall not be construed as having precedential significance for subsequent arms limitations."

Percy proposed July 13 an understanding (Amendment No. 414) to go at the end of the resolution of ratification as follows:

"(1) nothing in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, in the Protocol relating thereto, or in any related document commits the United States to enter into an agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which maintains in force after December 31, 1981, any prohibition or restriction under the Protocol; and

"(2) if the President signs such an agreement, before such agreement enters into force with respect to the United States, the President will submit such agreement to the Senate as a treaty for its advice and consent to ratification."

Lugar may go further with language stating simply that the protocol shall not be extended.

Hart proposed July 31 an understanding (Amendment No. 416) to go at the end of the resolution of ratification as follows:

"Subject to the understanding, which is to be made a part of the instrument of ratification, that nothing in the Protocol binds either of the Parties after the date of the termination of the Protocol, unless the Parties otherwise agree and approve such agreement, in accordance with their constitutional processes."

Post-Salt II negotiations: McGovern, Biden, Lugar, Moynihan, Proxmire

McGovern proposed July 16 an amendment to the resolution of ratification that upon ratification of SALT II, U.S. negotiators would be instructed to immediately begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for an immediate freeze on strategic nuclear weapons and for annual reductions in our strategic forces of 10% each year for three years, after which a summit meeting would be held to review the progress. He may also propose an alternate formulation.

Biden as part of his comprehensive understanding announced July 10, suggested the following wording:

"With regard to future arms negotiations, that the arms limitations required by this Treaty shall be considered only an interim measure, leading to future intensive efforts to achieve significant reductions in established levels of strategic nuclear weaponry."

Lugar may offer language dealing with instructions for SALT III, requiring real cuts.

Moynihan proposed August 1 Amendment No. 417 to go after paragraph (3), Article XIX stating:

"The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall, as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint Statement of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are unable to conclude such an agreement by December 31, 1981, the present Treaty shall terminate on that date."

- 5 -

Proxmire announced June 11 that he will offer an amendment to the Statement of Principles accompanying the treaty that would set a specific numerical goal of reducing to a range of 500-800 the land-based missiles of both nations. The range would apply to SALT III and would encompass MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles.

Soviet combat forces in Cuba: Church, DeConcini, Kassebaum

Church has discussed proposing language requiring the President, before the ratification process is completed, to find that the Soviet troops in Cuba do not comprise a combat unit and that the troops present no threat to the U.S. or to other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

DeConcini has introduced a reservation at the end of the resolution of ratification (Amendment No. 418) stating:

"Before the period at the end of the resolution of ratification, insert a comma and the following: "subject to the reservation, which is to be made a part of the instrument of ratification, that before the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification, the President shall have notified the Senate that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has removed all its combat troops and their support units from Cuba."

Kassebaum has introduced a reservation at the end of the resolution of ratification (Amendment No. 446) stating:

"(1) before the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification, the President of the United States of America transmits a certification to the United States Senate that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has eliminated its combat capability in Cuba, such notice of certification shall specify the basis on which such finding is made.

"(2) the President of the United States of America shall inform the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the establishment of any future such combat capability in Cuba would be inimical to the interest of the United States of America and could jeopardize the continuation of the SALT process."

Moratorium on deployment of new strategic systems: Hatfield

Hatfield on June 26 offered an amendment to the treaty (Amendment No. 413) to freeze mutually the arsenals of strategic nuclear destruction possessed by the U.S. and Russia at their present levels. The Amendment text is:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this treaty, each party agrees not to deploy, on or after the date of entry into force of this treaty, any number of strategic offensive arms in excess of the number of strategic offensive arms deployed by such party on the date of signature of this treaty, and each party agrees not to develop, test, or deploy strategic offensive arms of a type not deployed by such party on the date of signature of this treaty."

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U.S. military spending/Parity with Soviets: Biden, Zorinsky

Biden, as part of his comprehensive understanding of July 10, suggested the following language to make clear U.S. determination to maintain "essential equivalence":

"With regard to future strategic policy and nuclear weapons deployments, the United States shall continue to take all steps necessary to maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union and a stable condition of mutual nuclear deterrence."

Zorinsky suggested in a Foreign Relations Committee hearing that he may offer similar language to commit the U.S. to take all steps necessary to maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union.

Other Senators, such as Nunn, may offer language to try to get the U.S. to increase U.S. military spending by a certain percentage, such as 4%-5%.

Verification: Glenn, Lugar, Baker, Warner

Glenn has discussed a variety of proposals to enhance U.S. verification efforts of the treaty. Among the proposals that may be offered in some form are: 1) urge the Soviet Union not to encrypt any of its telemetry information, 2) assert the right of the U.S. to encrypt whatever information that the Soviets encrypt, 3) require announcement by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union of all missile tests prior to flight, including those inside national territory not now covered by the treaty, 4) require notification of appropriate Senate committees of complaints by either side to the Standing Consultative Commission that deals with questions of compliance, 5) assure that the U.S. can monitor shipments from Soviet defense plants.

Lugar is considering offering three proposals on verification: 1) language advocating placement of unmanned monitoring devices on Soviet soil and on U.S. soil in order to gather telemetry data, 2) a total ban on encryption of telemetry data and 3) an agreement that both sides will provide advance warning of all ICBM tests, and not just those beyond national territory.

Baker has discussed offering language concerning adequate monitoring and verification.

Another proposal might state that U.S. listening posts in foreign nations are a national technical means of verification. Warner may be considering language along this line.

Mobile ICBMs/MX: Biden, Baker, DeConcini, Hatfield

Biden, as part of his comprehensive understanding of July 10, suggested the following language concerning mobile ICBMs.

"With regard to future United States deployment of mobile land-based missiles, that such deployment, regardless of mode, shall, if accompanied by procedures conducive to appropriate Soviet verification efforts, be acceptable under the Treaty."

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Baker, in his June 21 press conference, suggested he might offer language to assert "the propriety of the mobile basing mode of the MX missile."

DeConcini is considering offering more specific language to deal with the vertical shelter scheme of the MX, such as the following:

"Subject to the understanding, which is to be made a part of the instrument of ratification, that nothing in the Treaty may be construed as requiring either Party to the Treaty to count, for the purposes of the limitations on the number of launchers permitted under the Treaty, as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launcher any vertical shelter (silo) that is not equipped with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launcher (as defined in the first paragraph of Article II of the Treaty)."

Hatfield may offer a proposal to bar or modify the Administration's proposal for building an MX. An amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill may be offered instead.

SS-18 heavy missile: Baker, Jackson

Baker, in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings, suggested an amendment to cut the number of Soviet SS-18 heavy missiles allowed from 308 to 150.

Jackson has discussed offering language asserting the right of the U.S. to build heavy missiles to match those of the Soviets.

#### Linkage

Biden, as part of his comprehensive understanding of July 10, suggested the following language on linkage:

"With regard to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, that ratification of this Treaty shall not be construed as acceptance by the United States of Soviet aims or conduct, but is instead based upon the imperative that U.S.-Soviet competition be regulated to reduce the danger of nuclear holocaust."

Recommittal of the treaty with instructions: Jackson

Jackson is considering offering a motion to recommit the treaty, with instructions that a new treaty: 1) provides the U.S. with the right to build modern heavy ICBMs equivalent to the Soviets', 2) counts the Backfire bomber, 3) does not limit cruise missile ranges unless all ballistic missiles with less than intercontinental range are similarly limited, 4) assures the right to build a mobile missile and 5) provides full verification through national technical means.

Launcher definition: Warner

Warner may offer language to tighten the definition of "launcher" in the treaty. Another possibility is an attempt to substitute actual weapon designations for the word "launcher" in the treaty.

Range limitations on cruise missiles

Language may be offered to drop the range limitation on U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles or to extend the same limit to Soviet weapons.

Throwweight

Language may be offered to allow the U.S. to achieve equality with the Soviet Union in throwweight.

Garn proposals

Garn offered an alternative SALT II package consisting of a comprehensive renegotiation resolution and six "essential" amendments to provide guidelines for improving the treaty. In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee September 18, Garn proposed a large number of amendments, too numerous to go into detail, but including: Backfire, heavy missiles, modification of silo launchers to heavy configuration, U.S. heavy ICBM test and deployment, MPS basing mode, definition of MPS as non-mobile, non-circumvention, verification, prohibition against deliberate concealment measures, GLCM/SLCM range extension, MIRVed GLCM/SLCM range extension, protocol extension, and agreed statements and common understandings.

Secretary/Senator/Pundit Kissinger proposals

Kissinger, in his July 31 testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, suggested the following conditions: 1) the treaty be coupled with a defense program representing an obligatory understanding between Congress and the President to build what is needed, 2) the Protocol may not be extended as far as cruise missiles are concerned and that there are no limitations on U.S. theatre nuclear weapons -- such as the cruise missiles -- unless there are similar limits on comparable Soviet weapons, 3) in any future agreement, the U.S. should be allowed to match every Soviet system -- including heavy ICBMs -- unless the Soviets give up the right to something comparable that we would be allowed, 4) the non-circumvention clause shall be interpreted so as not to interrupt cooperative relationships with allies, and 5) that the continuation of SALT II and any future SALT agreements be linked to Soviet geopolitical conduct.

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U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
24 SEPTEMBER 1979

## "Aggressive" Expansion by Soviets



Interview With  
Senator  
Richard G. Lugar,  
Republican,  
Of Indiana

**Q** Senator Lugar, does the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba constitute a threat to U.S. security?

**A** Yes, because their presence makes possible a Soviet extension in Cuba well beyond those particular troops. This is the type of protection the Soviets would require if they were to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba.

For instance, the troops could be the precursor of an expanded Cienfuegos naval base to service nuclear-armed submarines or the placement of nuclear weapons to guard the MiG-23s that are already in Cuba.

**Q** How is the Soviet action in Cuba different from our stationing troops near the Russian border in Europe?

**A** Our forces in Europe are purely defensive. They help to balance the forces of Western Europe against those of the Warsaw Pact. These forces are well known to everyone; they have not been introduced surreptitiously. We have not hidden their presence in Europe. Beyond this, since the Soviet Union is a closed society, we must rely more heavily than they upon intelligence collection from foreign locations.

**Q** The U.S. has troops stationed at the naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. Wouldn't they balance out the Russians?

**A** The troops at Guantánamo Bay have been there for many decades. They are very different from the Soviet brigade because they have not been introduced covertly, they are a known quantity, and the Castro regime has accommodated itself to them.

**Q** If the Soviet brigade has been in Cuba for years, as some believe, isn't it a bit late to be concerned about it?

**A** Anytime that American intelligence discovers a combat brigade, it's cause for very deep concern.

If it has been there for a long time, our belated revelation of it is either an indictment of our intelligence capabilities or a suggestion that the nature of the brigade has changed.

**Q** How far would you go in demanding the brigade's withdrawal?

**A** If I'm correct, this is a very aggressive extension of Soviet military diplomacy with regard to our country. We have to indicate that it is serious enough for us to forgo discussion of the SALT treaty and, beyond that, forgo trade and other relationships.

**Q** Is getting the troops out of Cuba worth the risk of losing Soviet agreement on SALT?

**A** As I said, SALT could very well be postponed until the troops are removed and the situation is clarified to our satisfaction.

There is another reason for postponing SALT: It's totally inconsistent for us to be debating the verification of the treaty at the same time that serious questions are being raised about our intelligence capability in Cuba.

**Q** Don't you think the United States is risking a military confrontation with the Soviet Union?

**A** I don't see a risk of military confrontation. Our response could be something that would lessen tension.

It would certainly give the Soviets the signal that they may not want but really need to have at this point. Our failure to insist on their leaving is likely to lead to an expanded Soviet presence, which really does risk military confrontation farther down the trail. □

## "Their Troops Don't Threaten Us"



Interview With  
Representative  
Bob Carr,  
Democrat,  
Of Michigan

**Q** Representative Carr, why do you feel that Soviet combat troops in Cuba pose no real threat to the United States?

**A** The only danger posed by these troops lies in their apparent ability to provoke some into statements of higher stupidity. Even if the Russians had a combat sealift or airlift capability—which they don't—no number of non-nuclear forces could hope to attack the U.S. without being annihilated. The only thing we're directly vulnerable to is attack by strategic weapons, and our second-strike nuclear force gives us an effective deterrent against that.

**Q** Aren't you concerned about a Russian military force being based so close to the U.S. mainland?

**A** How close they are is really of no significance since there's no way they can get the strength to attack us.

We have 4,700 troops in Turkey, which is right next door to the Soviet Union. Our troops there don't threaten the Soviets, and theirs in Cuba don't threaten us.

**Q** Could this incident be an early step toward the creation of a "fortress Cuba" in the Caribbean?

**A** A fortress is a defensive installation. A "fortress Cuba" could only be a problem for us if we plan to invade it—which we don't.

**Q** Isn't the Monroe Doctrine—the long-standing principle forbidding foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere—being challenged?

**A** The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement never unconditionally accepted by the Soviet Union.

And it's well to remember it also involved a promise that, in return for no foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere, we would not interfere in

Europe in any way. We violated that beginning in 1917 and are violating it today in NATO.

I support NATO nevertheless, but it does torpedo the Monroe Doctrine.

**Q** If not here, where would you draw the line on Soviet activity?

**A** That's the key question. I believe we should draw the line at the use of Soviet troops where they're not invited.

For example, if they invaded Nicaragua by force, we'd be fully justified in opposing them militarily.

**Q** Why should the Senate ratify the SALT treaty despite the troop incident?

**A** Fundamentally, because the treaty is in the interests of our national security. It isn't a reward for the Russians' good behavior; we do it because it's a good thing for us.

**Q** Does this troop incident show how little the Russians care about SALT?

**A** I don't think it has anything to do with the treaty. These troops have been there possibly for years or decades. What is new is our discovery of them.

**Q** Isn't the Soviet Union testing American resolve to maintain and defend stability in the hemisphere?

**A** All that's being tested is our ability to distinguish between the significant and the trivial. So far, we've flunked. □

Carter Urges a 'Sense of Proportion'

# U.S. Firm on Soviet Unit

By Martin Schram -  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter pledged yesterday to use "firm diplomacy" to deal with the newly disclosed presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and cautioned against "panic" and "exaggeration" at home.

The "status quo is not acceptable," Carter said, adding that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance soon will be negotiating with the Soviets about the once-secret brigade.

"We are confident about our ability to defend our country or any of our friends from external aggression," Carter said. "All of us ... must respond not only with firmness and strength, but also with calm and a sense of proportion."

The president's remarks were addressed as much to the Senate as to the Soviets, although Carter did not mention the pending strategic arms limitation treaty, which is in new trouble in the Senate because of the situation in Cuba.

"This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration," Carter said.

The president was prompted to deliver his first public pronouncement on the Soviet brigade, according to a senior aide, by numerous statements by senators that SALT II would not be approved if the brigade were allowed to remain in Cuba.

The president particularly was concerned, the aide said, because several senators with hard-line positions on the issue were liberals and moderates who had been counted as SALT II supporters.

Carter declared that the presence of

the Soviet brigade is "a very serious matter," and added:

"We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected."

By publicly defining the goal of the negotiations with the Soviets only as changing the "status quo," the president carefully avoided specifying what diplomatic outcome is needed to ease the situation in Cuba. He specifically declined to answer questions from a reporter about whether the United States would insist on the removal of the Soviet combat force.

Carter repeated statements by Vance earlier this week that the Soviet force consists of 2,000 to 3,000 troops equipped with conventional weapons, including about 40 tanks and some field artillery pieces.

The president said there is evidence that the unit has been operating in Cuba "for some time, perhaps for quite a few years."

He then went on to describe what the force is not.

"It is not an assault force," he said. "It does not have airlift or seagoing capability and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States."

"The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear."

In recent years, the Soviets have used Cuba as a listening post to monitor telephone calls placed from the United States, but U.S. intelligence officials have said they do not believe that a Soviet brigade would be needed

to defend the Soviet-built and Soviet-run intelligence network.

In remarks earlier yesterday, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security affairs adviser, called President Fidel Castro's contention that Cuba is not aligned with the Soviet Union "fundamentally ridiculous."

"Castro is a puppet of the Soviet Union and we view him as such," Brzezinski said, adding, "there isn't one instance" in which Castro has acted contrary to Soviet policy around the world.

In remarks to newspaper editors, Brzezinski said that economically, Cuba is "totally dependent" on the Soviet Union. He cited statistics, including \$3 billion in Soviet economic aid supplied to Havana each year, one-quarter of the Cuban gross national product.

"Militarily," Brzezinski added, "Cuba is entirely dependent on the Soviet Union."

He concluded: "In effect, Cuba is an active surrogate for a foreign policy which is not shaped by itself, and is paid for this by economic and military support on a scale that underlines Cuba's status as a dependent client of the Soviet Union."

Hours before Carter spoke to reporters at the White House he discussed the troops situation with 14 members of Congress in the Cabinet Room.

Among those present was Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho), who first disclosed publicly that the presence of the Soviet combat brigade had been confirmed by U.S. intelligence.

Church said that Carter spoke of a "crisis atmosphere developing through the press, and of the way everyone has treated the matter."

CONTINUED



said, but spoke critically of several proposed resolutions that would bar approval of the arms limitation treaty as long as the Soviet combat force remains in Cuba.

White House officials have been privately critical of Church's disclosure of the brigade, believing that he did so to bolster his hard-line credentials in Idaho, where he faces a reelection battle next year.

Carter told the congressional leaders that there was "no way to know how long" the Soviet brigade had been in Cuba, and said there was no "intelligence failure," in the delay in detecting it. Rather, he said, it resulted from a decision to allocate U.S. intelligence resources in other countries.

According to some who attended the meeting, Carter said the United States has a great deal of trouble getting good intelligence from Cuba. Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.), one of those present, agreed, saying it was easier to get information from the Soviet Union. Goldwater is vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

He told Carter this was the Soviets' test of the president's mettle.

Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) made the longest statement of the meeting, arguing that there was far from sufficient information available to declare that a crisis was at hand.

Several of those present said later that Carter received a generally sympathetic hearing from the group.

Reacting to Carter's later remarks, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said he wanted bold leadership. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), suggested that Carter should have engaged in some "big stick" diplomacy.

factory," said Lugar. "We need a call for leadership and a sense that the president is prepared to respond. . . . The president reacted slowly, almost passively."

"I think the president ought to have said to the Soviets, calmly, 'Get the troops out or no SALT II.'" Helms said. "I think Jack Kennedy would have already told the Soviets, 'Get the troops out or no SALT II.'"

"The president needs to be given time for diplomacy to work, time to obtain accurate information. I don't think it's time for a crisis atmosphere," Byrd said, adding that SALT II should not be "held hostage" by the troops situation.

"I still have expectations for calling the treaty up this year," he said.

Church said he did not think he was exaggerating the situation by saying there is no hope for Senate approval of the treaty if the troops remain.

"I think it's important that the Russians should know from the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that these two issues are related," Church said. "The Senate will not ratify the SALT treaty while Russian combat troops remain in Cuba. We do have to draw the line on Soviet combat troops somewhere."

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THE WASHINGTON POST  
30 August 1979

## Soviets Amenable To SALT Shifts, Senators Infer

By Kevin Klose

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Aug. 28—Senior Soviet officials have indicated a willingness to consider "significant" cutbacks in nuclear weapons stockpiles in any future negotiations about strategic weapons, according to the head of a U.S. Senate delegation visiting here.

Sen. Joseph D. Biden (D-Del.) said he also detected tacit Soviet acceptance of more comprehensive verification procedures than under the SALT II agreement, an attitude that could lead eventually to onsite inspections.

Biden and five other senators have looked for possible Soviet attitudes toward prospective negotiations on a third strategic arms limitation treaty during three days of meetings with Soviet officials.

Biden added that Soviet officials, during four plenary sessions devoted almost exclusively to strategic arms matters, accepted without strong demur the senators' assertions that such powerful Soviet tactical nuclear weapons systems as the SS-20 and Backfire bomber must be specifically included in any successor to the SALT II agreement. SALT II was signed by President Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in June. The treaty has come under sharp criticism from some senators who are expected to vote on its ratification in early winter.

According to one delegation source, the Soviets' attitudes were suggested as much by such silences as by specific Soviet retorts to the senators' statements. Biden and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) indicated this was notable especially in the Soviets' responses to the senators' repeated assertions that the Senate will insert "modifications" or "reservations" into the pending SALT II.

The Soviets were said to have listened carefully to the senators' explanations of these proposals and reportedly made no substantive reply. This calm response by the Kremlin group,

which included deputy chief of the Soviet general staff Sergei Akhromeyev, a strategic arms specialist, was in sharp contrast to the grim warnings by Brezhnev and other Politburo leaders that the Soviet Union would never accept modification of the accord, which took seven years to negotiate.

The senators met today with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in what Biden and Lugar described as a "very cordial," three-hour session devoted to detailed discussion of SALT issues.

They said Kosygin engaged them in lively debate on various points, but that the session was not marred by bitter disagreement.

The U.S. delegation, which also included Sens. David Boren (D-Okla.), Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and David Pryor (D-Ark.), arrived in Leningrad last week as guests of the Supreme Soviet, the figurehead national legislature. It is the sixth such delegation of senators or congressmen to come here in the past year and probably the last before the Senate moves to a final vote on the arms treaty.

Biden said Kosygin, who last year belittled the Senate in an angry flareup with a group led by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), seemed to understand both the role of the Senate and the importance of six votes on such a narrowly divided issue.

As the delegation leader, he told the Soviets during the Kremlin sessions that likely Senate treaty reservations will include:

- A provision that the Senate considers the "statements and common understandings" accompanying the treaty to have the same binding force as that document itself.

- Opposition to extension of the treaty past 1981.

- A provision ensuring that the treaty's "noncircumvention clause" does not rule out U.S. help to NATO allies to modernize intermediate range strike forces.

- A provision that the president must abrogate the treaty if the Soviets are found to have violated Brezhnev's nontreaty promises limiting the Backfire bomber.

A committee source said the Soviets generally mildly expressed the view that "these were internal matters of the United States" and thus no business of the Soviet officials.

Although the group planned to test Soviet reactions to the current Senate debate on SALT II, the discussions focused strongly on SALT III as well. Biden said the Soviets indicated willingness to negotiate tactical nuclear force strengths in Europe, that they also agreed that progress in dealing with the complex issues raised by such "forward based systems" and the cruise missile must be made well ahead of the SALT II protocol expiration.

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23 July 1979

## ***SALT Abrogation Urged On Verification Tampering***

Washington—Abrogation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 2 treaty by the U. S. upon probable evidence of Soviet interference with U. S. national technical means of treaty verification has been demanded by Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R.-N. Y.).

"If we have grounds for not trusting them, I couldn't care less about the rest of the stuff you have in here," Sen. Javits told Defense Secretary Harold Brown during SALT 2 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Brown told Sen. Javits a U. S. decision to abrogate, based on probable interfer-

ence by the Soviets, depends on how sure the U. S. is of its information and the seriousness of the intervention.

"I need more than that, and so does the Senate," Sen. Javits answered. Brown then told the committee that interference would be grounds to terminate the treaty. Sen. Javits also won a promise of abrogation from Brown if the Soviets convert missiles in ways that violate SALT 2. The position of Sen. Javits was supported by Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (D.-Del.).

Sen. Biden and Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio) were critical of the committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church (D.-Ida.), for allowing inadequate time for questions and answers during a closed hearing on verification.

Sen. Glenn charged the committee held its open hearing the following day without adequate background information on verification of launch weight, throw weight, yield and numbers of multiple independently targetable warheads, simulations, monitoring of the ban on SS-16 third-stage production, mobile ICBMs and determining the 5% size and weight difference between new and old missiles. He said he remains concerned that verification capabilities are, in some instances, still on the drawing boards.

Latest changes or additions to the treaty that will be introduced in the Senate are:

- An amendment by Sen. Jake Garn (R.-Utah) banning all missile test telemetry encoding. Administration witnesses have told the committee repeatedly the Soviets are not likely to decode telemetry

revealing technology not covered by the treaty, such as missile guidance methods

- Sen. George McGovern (D.-S. Dak) said he will attach arms reduction legislation to the SALT 2 resolution of ratification to establish three things: a one-year freeze on development or deployment of additional strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads, annual reductions of 10% in the arsenals of both sides for three years and a summit meeting every three years to review the percentage reductions.

Brown did not try to defend the U. S. ability to determine accurately whether the Soviets hold to the SALT 2 requirement that new missiles not exceed 5% of length, diameter and throw weight of the older missile. Instead, he noted that missile growth could be 100% without SALT 2 treaty. Treaty opponents and others doubt that the U. S. would be able to detect changes smaller than 30%.

Sen. McGovern added that the MX missile, which he opposes as a "preposterous waste of dollars," adds verification problems to the treaty. Administration sources have indicated the MX probably will not be deployed before the treaty expires in 1985.

Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R.-Ind.) said he is not sure the Soviets will care if they are caught violating the treaty, adding the treaty will give the world the perception that "we're on the run."

Sen. Richard Stone (D.-Fla.) said he doubts the U. S. has the willpower to prosecute a case of violation quickly and fully before the Standing Consultative Commission, based on the record during SALT 1.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) said he is concerned that the Soviets will convert SS-20 missiles, which have limited range for use as a mobile theater ballistic missile, to SS-16 intercontinental missiles "at night." The SS-20 uses the first two stages of the SS-16. All that is necessary for an SS-20 to become an intercontinental missile is attachment of the SS-16 third stage. Brown said he could not address Helms' concerns in public, but said the Soviets "can't get away with it."

### **Test Ban Shift**

Washington—Soviets have reneged a portion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, now under negotiation, that would allow placement of U. S. seismic sensors on Soviet soil, Rep. Jack F. Kemp (R.-N. Y.) said last week.

Rep. Kemp, who learned of the development two weeks ago, said the Soviets now insist only Soviet equipment be installed to aid in verification of Soviet compliance.

Rep. Kemp called for cancellation of a visit to the U. S. by Soviet scientists in August to study American seismic technology. He termed the scientists' trip "espionage" rather than scientific study.



National Security

### Foreign Relations Hearings Open:

## Main Issue Is Whether SALT Will Hinder U.S. Buildup

As Senate hearings on the SALT II arms limitation treaty opened, administration witnesses and their hard-line critics agreed that the Soviet threat to U.S. strategic forces would increase during the six-year life of the treaty.

The central issue joined in the first week of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was whether the pact would help or hinder U.S. efforts to offset that danger.

The Carter administration agreed with the critics that trends in the strategic arms balance were adverse to the United States, and that a significant increase in spending for U.S. strategic forces would be necessary to offset the continuing Soviet buildup.

But the administration argued that the treaty had not caused the increase in Soviet power, and that it would materially aid U.S. plans to counter that threat.

Most significantly, according to Defense Secretary Harold Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the treaty would allow U.S. development of the M-X mobile intercontinental missile, which is intended to nullify the Soviet advantages of larger and more numerous missile warheads. Moreover, the treaty's cap on the number of Soviet warheads allowed was essential to the success of M-X, they said.

In rebuttal, former SALT negotiators Paul Nitze and retired Army Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny insisted that the treaty was worthless at best because it would not prevent the increase in accurate Soviet missile warheads which were the principal threat to existing U.S. forces. At worst, they maintained, SALT II would interfere with needed U.S. arms programs, including M-X. And they warned that it might give the country a false sense of security that would undermine political support for an increase in defense spending.

—By Pat Towell

### Military Advantage

The administration's case was dramatized on July 9, the first day of hearings on the arms limitation treaty. Although Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance was the leadoff witness, Defense Secretary Brown spoke more than twice as long. And even in Vance's prepared statement, nine of the 21 pages dwelt on the military advantages of SALT II.

Brown stressed repeatedly that the treaty was no substitute for beefed up strategic arms programs. Partly on the basis of a national commitment to that additional spending, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the treaty as a "modest but useful" contribution to U.S. security, in the words of Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. David C. Jones. Its principal danger, they warned, was that the treaty would "tranquilize" the country and prevent it from paying

for the strategic arms buildup that the treaty would permit.

In the first three days of hearings, July 9-11, the administration's military-oriented argument for the treaty, coupled with the Joint Chiefs' endorsement, placed at a disadvantage the committee's declared treaty opponents, none of whom has a reputation as a weapons specialist.

But the pro-treaty momentum was checked by Rowny's forceful attack July 12. Rowny had represented the Joint Chiefs on the U.S. negotiating team during the entire period of SALT II negotiations. He retired from the Army June 30 because of his objections to the treaty.

No committee member explicitly joined the panel's three declared opponents of the current pact: Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn.; Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and Richard G. Lugar, R-Ind.

But Richard Stone, D-Fla., indicated deep suspicion that the treaty would interfere with the M-X system and that the United States would be timorous in insisting that Moscow comply with the treaty limits.

And Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, appeared unshaken in his belief that Soviet compliance with certain key



**HUDDLING ON SALT** — Secretary of State Vance huddles with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before SALT hearings open. Left to right are Sens. Percy, R-Ill.; Javits, R-N.Y.; Vance; Marshall D. Shulman, special adviser to the secretary for Soviet affairs, and Committee Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho.

articles simply could not be verified with current U.S. intelligence equipment.

Administration spokesmen and the Joint Chiefs argued that any Soviet violations that could tilt the military balance toward Moscow would be detected in time for offsetting U.S. actions.

### Reservations and Verification

The hearings removed any doubt that the Foreign Relations Committee will amend the resolution of ratification — but not necessarily the text of the treaty — explicitly to make ratification conditional on continued U.S. freedom to develop new weapons for its own use and to aid the arms programs of NATO allies.

Vance assured the panel that such reservations or understandings were superfluous. But many members believe that the Senate was deceived by the Nixon administration during the SALT I debate. Several committee liberals, whom the administration will need to lead the battle for the treaty, bluntly told Vance that the Senate would write administration assurances into the ratification document.

Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., implicitly endorsed such reservations on NBC's *Meet the Press* on July 8, the day after he returned from a trip to Moscow.

Soviet leaders now understood the difference between amendments to the treaty and amendments to the resolution of ratification, he said. And Byrd suggested they might be willing to accept certain "clarifications" that did not change the terms of the treaty. But he warned that if Senate actions required renegotiation of the treaty, the Russians would reopen areas now settled and demand new U.S. concessions.

### U.S. Buildup Planned

Because of increasing numbers of accurate ICBM warheads, the Soviet Union by about 1982 would be able to destroy approximately 90 percent of the 1,054 U.S. land-based missiles in a surprise attack.

For more than a decade, U.S. arms controllers have ridiculed this scenario, pointing out that even after such a strike, the United States could destroy Soviet society with thousands of nuclear warheads launched from submarines.

But Secretaries Brown and Vance rejected this argument, telling the For-

eign Relations Committee that the United States also had to maintain "essential equivalence" with Moscow. It needed forces that could destroy armored military targets, such as intercontinental missiles in underground silos.

If the Russians alone were able to surgically destroy military targets, according to the argument, it could embolden Soviet decision makers in their competition with the United States. They would know that in case an international crisis got out of hand, they might be able to destroy U.S. military targets while holding American cities hostage to prevent U.S. retaliation. American officials would become more hesitant to defend U.S. interests against Soviet pressure tactics.

"Essential equivalence" currently depends on the U.S. land-based missile force, the administration officials agreed. And as those missiles became vulnerable to Soviet attack, other weapons would be relied on to destroy armored Soviet military targets:

- For a few years after 1982, B-52 bombers would play that role. Soviet defenses could not cope with the plane's radar-jamming equipment, Brown said. And he quoted the assessment of bomber chief Gen. Richard Ellis that in case of a war, 75 percent of the bombers would reach their targets.

- By the time Russian radar could cope with the B-52s, they no longer would have to penetrate Soviet defenses because each plane would carry a dozen long-range cruise missiles that could destroy hard targets.

- And by the late 1980s, when Soviet defenses might be ready to deal with a massed attack of hundreds of hard-to-find cruise missiles, the mobile M-X missile would be replacing the current U.S. ICBMs with their vulnerable, fixed launchers.

But Nitze and Rowny insisted that intercontinental missiles were uniquely suited to offsetting the Soviet missile force. Bombers and cruise missiles that would take hours to reach their targets would not suffice. So they seemed to dismiss as irrelevant this or any other treaty that did not halt the increase in Soviet missile warheads in time to protect current U.S. missiles.

And Nitze objected that since the current treaty would ban testing of mobile intercontinental missiles through 1981, it would bar an interim solution to the vulnerability of U.S. missiles. He recommended that existing Minuteman missiles quickly be

adapted to mobile launchers. The Pentagon has dismissed this proposal since it would produce mobile missiles only a few years earlier than the M-X program.

### How Real the Limits?

One provision of SALT II was essential to the eventual success of M-X, according to the administration. The so-called "fractionation cap" limited the number of warheads that could be carried on each type of Soviet missile. Since there was a ceiling on the total number of Soviet missiles, the treaty thus indirectly set a ceiling on the number of Soviet missile warheads.

The security of M-X from a Soviet attack depended on the 200 U.S. missiles being dispersed among several thousand potential launch sites. Since Moscow could not be sure which sites held the real missiles, it would have to attack all of the several thousand sites to destroy the missile force. If there were more sites than Russia had warheads, an attack would be impossible.

According to this argument, the fractionation cap limited the number of M-X launch sites that would be needed to make a Soviet attack futile. Without that limit, the huge Soviet SS-18 missile could carry 20 or 30 warheads, instead of the 10 allowed by the treaty.

But Nitze and Rowny argued this would not protect M-X since SALT II would expire at the end of 1985, before the first M-Xs were deployed. Within less than a year of the treaty's expiration, Rowny said, the Russians could be adding to the SS-18s enough warheads to swamp the M-X system.

Brown insisted that since Russia could not test missiles with more than the permitted number of warheads under the treaty, the effects of the cap would outlast SALT II.

A similar disagreement will recur throughout the congressional debate over SALT II's verifiability. The administration's premise is that militarily significant programs could not be improvised on short notice. Development of a new weapon would be a long process which U.S. intelligence could monitor at many points.

But critics typically demand much more airtight assurances that any Soviet violations of the treaty could be detected.

### Will to Compete?

Catching up with the Soviet strategic pace would not come cheap. Sec-

retary Brown estimated that if the treaty were approved, annual spending on strategic arms would have to rise about 25 percent to \$12.5 billion (before inflation). Without the treaty, it would cost \$15 billion annually to offset an unconstrained Soviet program, he said.

Brown's figures were inadequate, according to the Joint Chiefs. They recommended a real annual increase of 5 percent in the defense budget, covering conventional forces as well as strategic arms.

And Nitze insisted that even if SALT II were ratified, strategic arms spending would have to go up to \$15 billion.

Looming over the debate about whether the country would accept that burden were memories of 1972. That year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the SALT I agreements on condition that the Nixon administration begin a vigorous program to develop various strategic weapons that were allowed by those pacts. But the planned strategic buildup was a casualty of some defense contractors' problems and the declining defense budgets (in constant dollars) of the mid-1970s.

The 1979 Joint Chiefs were "seriously concerned lest the nation repeat earlier mistakes through complacency, an incomplete understanding of the Soviet buildup, or an insufficient appreciation of the broader consequences," Gen. Jones told the Foreign Relations panel.

Nitze predicted that another arms control treaty would have the same narcotizing effect as the 1972 agreements. After ratification of SALT II, "I think it unlikely that the executive branch would request or Congress appropriate" funds beyond the \$12 billion annually in Brown's program. And that program, he insisted was not enough.

Sen. Lugar concurred in Nitze's analysis. "Let's say we're tired of treaties being a tranquilizer," he urged, so the country would take the necessary steps.

But Sen. Jacob K. Javits, R-N.Y., demurred: "I don't see why we shouldn't take little steps [toward arms control] so long as we believe that we have the will and volition," to keep up U.S. strength. And he told Nitze, "On the issue of our minds and wills, we're just as expert as you."

Javits left no one in doubt as to his own state of mind on the need for a beefed up U.S. strategic weapons pro-



ADMINISTRATION'S CASE — Defense Secretary Harold Brown makes a point as Secretary of State Vance looks on. Both stressed the military advantages to the U.S. under the treaty.

gram: "We've been goofing off for 10 years," he said. "We haven't put our money where our mouth is."

And despite his warning about the precedent of 1972, Gen. Jones told the panel he did not think it was necessary to kill the treaty in order to shock the public into supporting increased defense spending: "I sense a change in the belief of the American public as to the adequacy of our defense," he said.

### Another Treaty?

Gen. Rowny repeatedly predicted that if the current treaty were rejected, another SALT pact, more favorable to U.S. interests, eventually could be negotiated. He based that judgment on his six and one-half years as a member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team.

The Soviet Union would try to make propaganda hay out of the current treaty's failure, he conceded. But he maintained that Moscow wanted a SALT treaty too badly to refuse indefinitely to reopen the negotiations. The Soviet Union wanted the international prestige of formally certified parity as a superpower equal to the United States, he said. And its economy already was stretched to the limit with its current defense programs.

The current treaty turned out badly, in Rowny's view, because it was poorly negotiated by the United States. "We gave concession after con-

cession," he lamented, partly because U.S. negotiators did not understand the difference between the American and Russian temperaments.

"We're problem-solvers and they're competitors, adversaries," he said. As a result, U.S. negotiators looked for even-handed agreements, while their Russian counterparts sought unilateral advantages at every turn.

But beside the question of cultural differences, Rowny said, the United States simply had used bad negotiating tactics "in our zeal for the treaty and telegraphing that zeal" to the Russians.

The proper U.S. course would have been to hang tough on the March 1977 proposal to severely cut the number of ICBM warheads, thus increasing the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Instead, according to Rowny, "the Soviet Union bluffed and we folded. . . . My own view is, they were trying the new [U.S.] president."

Administration witnesses simply maintained that the current treaty was the best one that could have been negotiated at the present time. The Russians rejected the March 1977 proposal because it was too radical a break from the 1974 Ford-Brezhnev agreement at Vladivostok that set much less restrictive limits than the current treaty contained.



And Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine, bristled at Rowny's certainty that a more favorable bargain could have been struck. "If for 10 years we've been represented by people who overlooked an obviously better bargain in terms of our national security, that's a serious charge," he told Rowny. "How could you perceive something to which everyone else is blind?" he demanded.

### The Liberal Critics

On the opening day of the hearing, Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., repeated his earlier warnings that he might oppose the treaty on grounds that it did not prevent vast increases in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms.

He acknowledged that it probably was taken for granted that he could not really bring himself to vote against an arms control treaty. But he insisted that he was one of four or five senators who "will not vote for the illusion of arms control."

Repeatedly during the hearings, McGovern cited the administration commitment to build M-X as evidence that Carter was risking future arms control efforts in order to win hard-line support for SALT II.

But he never conditioned his support for the treaty on setting much lower arms levels or on cancellation of the M-X. He demanded only that the treaty leave "a realistic hope" of significant future weapons reductions.

In the hearings, the administration presented an argument that appeared to be aimed at McGovern, reasoning that M-X would make it less difficult to negotiate future reductions in the number of intercontinental missiles. The safety of M-X from a Soviet attack would depend on the number of alternative launch sites in which each missile could be hidden.

According to this argument, if the number of missiles was cut while the number of launch sites remained unchanged, the remaining M-Xs would be no more vulnerable to attack than the larger M-X force.

### Reservations Weighed

At the very outset of the hearings, Church indicated that the committee would adopt a reservation or understanding that would formally condition Senate approval of SALT II on various documents that technically are not contained in the treaty. These include the "agreed statements and common understandings" which

elaborate on the meaning of various provisions of the treaty and the Soviet agreement to limit production of the Backfire bomber that is not covered by the treaty limits.

Three other issues emerged as the focus of possible efforts to amend the treaty or to attach conditions to its ratification:

**M-X Missile.** The administration has announced that for protection against a Soviet missile attack, each of the M-X missiles to be deployed in the late 1980s will be shuttled at random among 20 to 40 hidden launch sites. But it maintains that the weapon should be designed so that if Moscow deployed a similar mobile missile, the United States would be able to count the number of actual missiles in the field.

Partly for that reason, the administration has pushed the Air Force to develop an M-X plan in which each missile would rest horizontally in a launch site, so that reconnaissance satellites could, under certain conditions, count the number of missiles deployed. The Air Force originally had proposed a cheaper version in which the missile would rest vertically in the launch site, ready for instant firing.

Hard-line critics, led by Nitze, have insisted that the vertical version is far superior but that Moscow has claimed it would violate SALT II. Nitze and Sen. Stone appeared to agree that the treaty should be amended to ensure that the vertical M-X would be permitted.

**Protocol Extension.** A portion of the treaty — referred to as a protocol — would bar through 1981 deployment (though not the testing) of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers. The Pentagon is developing a nuclear-tipped, ground-launched cruise missile, that could not be deployed until after 1981, with a range of nearly 2,000 kilometers.

Supporters of this project maintain that since it could reach Soviet territory from Western Europe, it would offset Soviet long-range missiles that could strike anywhere in Western Europe from Soviet bases.

Since SALT III negotiations presumably would be under way when the protocol limits formally expired, treaty critics have warned that the United States would be under intense diplomatic and domestic political pressure to continue observing the limits, thus killing off the cruise missile project.

Secretary Vance told the committee July 10 that any future limitation of U.S. weapons designed for use in Europe should be linked to limits on Soviet systems having the same purpose.

But several senators have proposed that the ratification resolution be amended to stipulate that any presidential decision to extend the protocol limits would require approval by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.

**Non-circumvention Clause.** Article 12 of the treaty provides that neither country would circumvent the treaty through another country.

Critics have warned that this could be construed to prevent U.S. transfer of some weapons technology to its NATO allies. The issue is more than theoretical since the United Kingdom and France reportedly have expressed keen interest in the possibility of modernizing their strategic forces with cruise missiles.

The administration denied that traditional U.S. dealings with its allies would be constrained by the provision, arguing that it had established this principle during the negotiations by explicitly rejecting a treaty provision barring the transfer of treaty-controlled weapons technology.

Secretary Brown told the committee that even Trident submarine missiles could be transferred to Britain under SALT II. But he cautioned that aside from SALT considerations, the United States would decide on a case-by-case basis whether to provide any given weapon to an ally.


But several committee members, insisting that SALT could not drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, appeared inclined to support a reservation explicitly linking the administration interpretation to ratification of the treaty.

Administration witnesses and Joint Chiefs Chairman Jones warned against any reservation stating that allied cooperation on one or two specific types of weapons would be consistent with the treaty. This could be construed to limit allowable cooperation to the specified items.

"Where the decision is up to the United States, we ought to be able to make the decision without having to negotiate with the Soviet Union," said Jones.

But Sen. Sarbanes was dubious about that line of reasoning: "If [the Russians] can argue from a different view of the language, we've sown seeds for a future conflict."

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Photos by James K. W. Atherton—The Washington Post

SALT critics Nitze, left, and Rowny tell Senate panel the pact would weaken United States, boost Soviet Union.

## Critic Urges Senate to Force Renegotiation

# SALT Called Danger to U.S. Security

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

Lt. Gen. Edward J. Rowny, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the American SALT delegation for the past six years, testified yesterday that the new arms treaty negotiated by his delegation would establish American strategic inferiority and endanger the nation's security.

Rowny, who resigned from the Army last month so he could speak against SALT II, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it should force a wholesale renegotiation of the treaty. He promised the committee that the Soviet Union would be willing to renegotiate since

"they need it [SALT] more than we do."

"We must make it clear we will not accept strategic inferiority," Rowny told the committee. "The treaty, as it now stands, heavily tilts the balance against the United States. This treaty will not enhance our security."

Rowny's opposition to SALT II has been well known for years inside the small community of experts that follows SALT closely. In December 1977, The Washington Post reported from Geneva an interview he gave that sharply criticized the treaty as it was then emerging.

At that time officials in the Carter administration began to talk privately

of replacing him on the SALT delegation, and there were rumors that he might resign.

But Rowny stayed on until last month, and his intimacy with the negotiating process clearly impressed many senators who heard him yesterday. So did the forcefulness of his presentation and the calm, deliberate way in which he answered senators' questions.

Rowny testified that SALT II would give the Soviets huge advantages over the United States in the number of thermonuclear warheads on their land-based missiles—by 3 to 1—and

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# SALT Held Danger to U.S. Security

## SALT, From A1

in the destructive power of their weapons.

He also said he doubted any Soviet leader would risk the "untold damage on the Soviet Union" that would follow if the Russians actually used these advantages in an attack. But he expressed fear that Soviet leaders "would be encouraged to take greater risks in pursuing political goals" by the strategic advantages he said SALT II would give them.

"Because the treaty does not actually put a brake on the momentum of the massive Soviet buildup," Rowny testified, "the United States will for the first time not be able to maintain essential equivalence or nuclear parity" if it is ratified.

Rowny repeatedly told the Foreign Relations Committee that the United States could have secured a much better SALT II pact if American negotiators had adopted tougher bargaining tactics. "We gave concession after concession," he said.

In a spirited cross-examination, Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) challenged Rowny sharply on this point.

How was it possible, Muskie asked, that all the other officials involved in negotiating SALT II failed to perceive this potential weakness in the Soviet position that Rowny claimed to perceive? "If, for 10 years, we've been represented by people in these negotiations who overlooked obvious opportunities for a better bargain," Muskie said, "that's a serious charge." He challenged Rowny to explain the basis for his view.

The heavy-set general, sitting calmly at the witness table, looked squarely at Muskie through thick eyeglasses and told him: "The people who negotiated this thing in Geneva at times had their hands tied." The pursuit of a treaty, he added, was so important to officials in Washington that they made concessions to the Soviets rather than holding to firm negotiating positions.

Was this "a gut instinct," Muskie asked, or did Rowny have "solid evidence available to others" that the Soviets would have made additional concessions? Rowny's replies to this and similar questions centered only on U.S. negotiating tactics; he did not cite specific evidence of missed American opportunities.

"Your gut instincts may be great," Muskie told Rowny, "but I think you must have something more than that to operate on."

Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) challenged Rowny to explain how the Soviets could use the advantage he perceived them getting under SALT II if—as Rowny testified—a rational Soviet leader would not initiate a nuclear war.

Rowny replied that the confidence a Soviet leader might feel knowing he had strategic advantages might embolden him to escalate a crisis, not knowing where he was going and not knowing where to pull out of the escalation.

McGovern said he couldn't see how a Soviet leader who knew that America could retaliate with great destructive power nevertheless could feel bold enough "to do anything that might risk a nuclear exchange."

Rowny, who had already testified that he doubted a Soviet leader would ever launch a nuclear attack, told McGovern that Soviet military literature is filled with references to fighting and winning a nuclear war, and that the Soviets believe they have an effective civil defense program to protect their population.

Rowny was also challenged on his confident prediction that the Soviets would willingly reopen negotiations on SALT II if the Senate forced that to happen. Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), who was generally friendly to Rowny's testimony, elicited from Rowny the comment that his own study of Russian history and experience negotiating with the Soviets convinced him they would reopen the talks.

"This is going to be a leap of faith that we take if we reject this treaty," Lugar responded.

Rowny testified that in his opinion the Soviets wouldn't exceed the numerical limits on their arsenal in SALT II even if the treaty is rejected. "They have no need to do so," he said, citing the large warhead advantage they could acquire under the SALT II limits. They would more likely devote their resources to qualitative improvements, Rowny said. At the same time, however, he testified that SALT II would allow the Soviets to substantially add to their number of warheads in 1985, when the treaty would run out—another weakness in the document, he said.

Rowny was the second and lesser-known witness to testify against the treaty yesterday, but his comments seemed to overshadow those of the first, Paul H. Nitze, a former Pentagon official and SALT negotiator.

Nitze used many of the same arguments Rowny employed to criticize SALT II, though he refused to come out flatly against the treaty. His testimony became a snappish confrontation with a series of senators, some of whom Nitze interrupted to make his points.

Rowny noted some positive elements in the SALT II treaty, but Nitze declined to say a positive word about anything in it. "To accept the case being made" for SALT II by the Carter administration, Nitze said, "with all its fallacies and im-

plausibilities, can only incapacitate our minds and wills for doing the things necessary to redress the strategic balance." Nitze quoted Lincoln: "First we must disenfranchise ourselves, then we shall save the country."

Nitze, like Rowny, emphasized statistics he said showed the United States would come out of SALT II in 1985 in a substantially weaker position than the Soviet Union. He said that in 1983 the Soviets would have twice America's capacity to destroy "soft" targets, five times America's capacity to attack the enemy's missiles in their protective silos and three times the total explosive power of the U.S. arsenal.

"Strategic parity is slipping away from us and the Soviets can be expected to achieve meaningful strategic superiority, probably by 1982 and most certainly by 1985, unless we take the most urgent steps to reverse current trends," Nitze said.

Nitze, like Rowny, was asked why the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who testified for SALT II Wednesday—disagreed with both of them on so many points. Part of the answer, Nitze said, was that the chiefs "have been misled by the White House" about the meaning of SALT II.

Nitze said the best outcome of the SALT debate would be the emergence of a clear majority in the Senate that would announce its determination not to "concede military superiority to the Soviets," would change SALT II to make it more favorable to the United States, and would face up to the consequences of both positions.

## Toon to Stump For SALT Support

Retiring U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon yesterday declared his support for SALT and said he planned to speak out for the arms limitation treaty in a series of cross-country speeches.

Toon made his comments moments after arriving from Moscow at Dulles International Airport. His support for SALT was thought in doubt, last month when reports surfaced during the Vienna summit that he had changed his mind on whether Soviet compliance with the treaty could be verified.

But at an impromptu news conference after those reports came out, Toon said he still supported the treaty as a "valuable contribution to arms control."

At the airport yesterday Toon said, "I intend to do some speaking around the country" in support of the pact. Asked if he supported it outright, he replied, "Oh, yes."

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## Panel Hears Bare-Bones Defense of Pact

### SALT Hearings Under Way

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration opened its formal defense of the strategic arms limitation treaty before the Senate yesterday, arguing that a combination of accelerated defense spending and the treaty is needed to preserve American security.

In opening hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the great marble vault of the Senate Caucus Room, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown adopted a bare-bones defense of SALT II. By itself, both said, the treaty will not guarantee "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union; billions more must be spent on new weapons as well.

But without the treaty, both said, the task of protecting American national interests would become more expensive and more dangerous.

In their joint appearance the two secretaries never mentioned detente with the Soviet Union, nor did they predict any secondary benefits in improved Soviet-American relations if SALT were approved.

This was the first day of the great SALT debate, and the old Caucus Room—made famous most recently by the Watergate hearings—was filled with television cameras, reporters and spectators. But there were only occasional flashes of drama and few attempts to seriously challenge either the treaty or the two secretaries who testified for it.

Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), who has established himself as an opponent of the treaty as it now is written,

injected the first note of political excitement into the generally stolid hearing with a forceful speech in "deadly" Soviet land-based missiles, implying that Soviet advantages in this weapons category were dangerous to the United States.

Defense Secretary Brown responded to Baker in kind, saying with some emotion that singling out one category of the strategic equation was misleading. "You've picked probably the least significant criterion," Brown told Baker.

Later, the chairman of Baker's presidential campaign, Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), pursued the same "line of questioning," asking Brown to confirm that the Soviets' SS18 supermissile was the one weapon in the Soviet arsenal that created grave problems for the United States—a position Baker has taken publicly.

Brown gave Lugar a lecture on the arithmetic of nuclear strategy, arguing that the theoretical vulnerability of Amer-

See SALT, A14, Col. 1



By James K. W. Atherion—The Washington Post

By James K. W. Atherion—The Washington Post

# Brown, Vance Defend Treaty As Debate on SALT II Begins

SALT, From A1

ican land-based missiles to a sneak attack by Soviet land-based missiles would exist even if the Soviets dismantled all their SS18s. Lugar did not dispute Brown's point but went on to another line of questioning.

If any new ground was broken yesterday, it was in Vance's answers to questions from Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) about the Carter administration's attitude toward changing the treaty. Why, Javits asked, had President Carter joined with Soviet authorities in warning that changes would be unacceptable?

"Carter spoke before the Soviet leaders said anything," Vance replied. Then he went on to soften the administration's position appreciably.

"We recognize the Senate's power to advise and consent includes the power" to recommend changes, Vance said, but he added that efforts should be made to alter the pact "only in the case of clear and urgent need." The administration would have to evaluate any proposed changes in terms of whether they served U.S. interests, whether they would require reopening negotiations and whether they would lead to "no treaty at all," Vance said.

"These carefully chosen words seemed calculated to defuse the tension that has developed between the Senate and the White House on the subject of changing the treaty."

Numerous senators, their aides and some administration officials have said privately in recent days that some Senate changes in the treaty are inevitable.

In their prepared testimony, Vance and Brown returned again and again to the point that the United States must modernize its strategic forces to maintain a stable balance with the Soviet Union. "The security of the United States requires us to maintain... forces that are equivalent to those of the Soviet Union," as Vance put it.

This emphasis reflects a decision inside the administration that "equality" is the most important issue in the SALT debate, and that the administration must convince both the Senate and the nation that it is committed to maintaining equality.

Brown gave detailed figures on what his version of equality would cost—an additional 25 percent on the strategic arms budget, for starters. Under SALT II, U.S. strategic spending should rise from about \$10 billion a year to around \$12.5 billion, Brown said. If SALT II is rejected, he said,

that figure should rise to \$15-\$18 billion.

One new member of the administration's SALT-sealing team, Washington lawyer Lloyd N. Cutler, who argued in favor of emphasizing the quality issue in yesterday's testimony, sat throughout just behind Vance and Brown. Several times Cutler leaned forward to whisper suggestions, and on several occasions his advice appeared to be taken, leading to further comments from the secretaries.

Carter has named Cutler to an unpaid position as coordinator of the administration's case on behalf of the treaty.

Also appearing with Vance and Brown was Ralph Earle, chief U.S. negotiator for the treaty. He was seated to Vance's right.

In his prepared testimony, Vance described four "imperatives of our national security," all of which would be served by approving SALT II. First, he said, the treaty "will greatly assist us in maintaining a stable balance of nuclear forces" by inhibiting the Soviet strategic program while allowing the United States to conduct an extensive modernization program of its forces. ("SALT II constrains them more than it constrains us," Brown said later.)

Second, Vance said, the treaty would improve "our ability to monitor and evaluate Soviet strategic forces and programs." The treaty includes important provisions: prohibiting deception and concealment, Vance said. It also bans the Soviet mobile missile SS16, which might be difficult to monitor, he added. "We will be able to detect any Soviet violations before they could affect the strategic balance," Vance said.

Brown was asked about earlier statements he had made that it would take a year to restore SALT monitoring capability lost to the United States when its listening posts in Iran were closed early this year. Brown reiterated Vance's comment that the Soviets could not get away with any significant cheating.

The third argument for SALT II, Vance said, is that it would make SALT III possible. He acknowledged disappointment that this pact did not go further, but added: "We should build on the progress we have made. The alternative is to return to an unrestrained arms competition."

Fourth, Vance went on, "America's North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have a keen interest in seeing SALT II ratified. Defeat of the treaty would be a profound blow to

our closest friends. Its approval will benefit our most valued alliances. It will signal continued American leadership for peace."

Both Vance and Brown offered grim pictures of a nuclear war. This was Vance's:

"Together, the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union already hold more than 14,000 strategic nuclear warheads and bombs. The smallest of these are several times as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. If a fraction of those weapons were ever fired, tens of millions of our people and tens of millions of the Soviet people would perish. Nuclear war would be a catastrophe beyond our imagination—for the aggressor as much as the victim."

In his prepared remarks Brown said recent trends in strategic forces favored the Soviets, but he also predicted that Soviet forces would grow much faster without SALT II than with it. Defeat of the treaty could cost the United States an additional \$30 billion to keep up with the Soviets over the next decade, he claimed, without elaborating on how that would be spent.

If SALT II were rejected, Brown said, "it is not certain" that the United States could establish a better position relative to the Soviets than with the treaty.

Talk of more defense spending with SALT upset one member of the Foreign Relations Committee, George McGovern (D-S.D.).

"True security is attainable only by mutual and substantial arms reduction," McGovern said. "Piling on more nuclear overkill does not enhance our diplomatic prestige or our military defense. If the Soviets wish to bankrupt themselves on weapons programs, let them do it."

Warning that his vote for SALT II is not certain, McGovern said: "I am not willing to endorse an arms control hoax which turns a weapons limitation treaty into nuclear expansion which is militarily unwarranted, fiscally wasteful and diplomatically destabilizing."

Several senators expressed concern that the protocol to SALT II would prevent the United States from sharing military technology with the other NATO members. Vance and Brown flatly rejected this view. Under SALT II, Brown said, America even could provide its allies with Trident missile-

carrying submarines if it wanted to. The Trident is one of the country's most potent strategic weapons.

Of the senators on the committee, only Baker chose to fire across the administration's bow on the first day of hearings. He said the issue was whether "we gave away the store" in negotiating SALT II.

When the SALT process began a dozen years ago, Baker said, the United States enjoyed clear military superiority, which has now been lost. He suggested that this left the coun-

try in a seriously weakened position.

Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) followed Baker in questioning yesterday, and hinted at the debate to come by ridiculing Baker's analysis of declining U.S. power.

"I don't recall us in 1967 being able to work our will" in the world, Biden said sarcastically. U.S. influence, he said, depends on "the morality of our cause . . . the strength of our economy . . . and our conventional forces."

Frank Church (D-Idaho), the committee chairman, noted that many

Americans may be listening to the SALT hearings this month while waiting in gasoline lines. He urged the public to recognize that this debate touches their personal interests.

Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.) said he discovered while home over the Fourth of July holiday that many of his constituents don't believe the government will do what is necessary to maintain American strength on an equal footing with the Soviets. "What kind of commitment can we unilaterally make to the American public?" Zorinsky asked.